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Oleg Itskhoki in the New Yorker
/in News/by Jenail MobarakaUCLA Professor Oleg Itskhoki makes a cameo appearance in the New Yorker article “Is Selling Shares in Yourself the way of the Future?” The article can be found here.
Lee Ohanian testifies before the U.S. Senate on housing policies
/in News/by Jenail MobarakaUCLA Professor Lee Ohanian testified before the U.S. Senate on July 20, 2022 on housing policies. The C-SPAN video of the hearing is available here.
Conference in Honor of Harold Demsetz
/in News/by Jenail MobarakaOn May 27th, former colleagues, students, and friends of Harold Demsetz (1930-2019) hosted a conference in his honor. A video of the conference is available here. Harold Demsetz (1930-2019), a long-time professor at UCLA, was a pioneer in the development and use of microeconomic theory to analyze questions of how property rights and institutional arrangements […]
Pierre Olivier Weill becomes Coeditor of Theoretical Economics
/in News/by Jenail MobarakaOn July 1st, Pierre Olivier Weill became coeditor of Theoretical Economics. Theoretical Economics is the leading journal in economic theory. It is open access and is a journal of the Econometric Society. More information about Theoretical Economics can be found here.
Pablo Fajgelbaum named to the Board of Editors of American Economic Review Insights
/in News, Uncategorized/by Jenail MobarakaOn July 1st, Pablo Fajgelbaum was named to the Board of Editors of American Economic Review Insights. More information about American Economic Review Insights can be found here.
Alexander Bloedel
/in Faculty Ladder Applied Economic Theory, Game Theory, Mechanism Design, Microeconomic Theory/by Jenail MobarakaAlexander Bloedel is an Assistant Professor of Economics at UCLA. He is an economic theorist studying topics in information economics, mechanism design, dynamic games, and bounded rationality. His recent research focuses on (i) costly information acquisition/processing (e.g., “rational inattention”) in both single-agent and strategic settings, and (ii) dynamic incentive problems with applications in macroeconomics and […]

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